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In the political arena, actors often describe their opponents as 
incompetent or stupid (e.g., Anson, 2018; Mark, 2006). 
Indeed, empirical evidence supports the view that a link 
between cognitive abilities and political attitudes exists (e.g., 
Kanazawa, 2010; Meisenberg, 2015). More specifically, 
most studies indicate that lower cognitive abilities are linked 
to the endorsement of conservative political views (for over-
views, see Onraet et al., 2015; Van Hiel et al., 2010). 
However, a closer inspection of the evidence on the ideol-
ogy-ability link reveals that the association between lower 
scores in cognitive ability tests and conservative political 
preferences holds in particular for sociocultural attitudes 
(Onraet et al., 2015) while the evidence with respect to eco-
nomic attitudes is much more inconsistent. In fact, some 
studies indicate that the correlation between cognitive abili-
ties and economic conservatism tends to be positive rather 
than negative (e.g., Caplan & Miller, 2010; Carl, 2014; 
Johnston, 2018).
In the present research, we aimed at synthesizing the 
available empirical evidence on the link between cognitive 
abilities and economic ideology in a meta-analysis (Study 1) 
and at testing different theoretical accounts of the association 
using representative survey data (Study 2). In the following, 
we start with a short discussion of multidimensional models 
of political ideology and then give an overview of empirical 
findings on the association of cognitive abilities with (a) 
sociocultural attitudes and (b) economic attitudes. Next, 
we compare different theoretical perspectives on the link 
between cognitive abilities and economic attitudes before 
turning to our own analyses.
Conceptualizing Political Ideology and 
Cognitive Abilities
Political ideology has been defined “as an interrelated set of 
attitudes and values about the proper goals of society and 
how they should be achieved” (Tedin, 1987 p. 65). A perti-
nent debate in political psychology concerns the extent to 
which political attitudes are organized along one or more 
ideological dimensions (for an overview, see Jost et al., 
2009). According to one-dimensional accounts (e.g., Jost, 
2006), most political conflicts in Western societies can be 
1046808 PSPXXX10.1177/01461672211046808Personality and Social Psychology BulletinJedinger and Burger
research-article2021
1GESIS—Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Cologne, Germany
Corresponding Author:
Alexander Jedinger, GESIS—Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, 
Unter Sachsenhausen 6-8, 50667 Cologne, Germany. 
Email: alexander.jedinger@gesis.org
Do Smarter People Have More 
Conservative Economic Attitudes? 
Assessing the Relationship Between 
Cognitive Ability and Economic Ideology
Alexander Jedinger1  and Axel M. Burger1
Abstract
Evidence on the association of cognitive ability with economic attitudes is mixed. We conducted a meta-analysis (k = 20, 
N = 46,426) to examine the relationship between objective measures of cognitive ability and economic ideology and analyzed 
survey data (N = 3,375) to test theoretical explanations for the association. The meta-analysis provided evidence for a small 
positive association with a weighted mean effect size of r = .07 (95% CI = [0.02, 0.12]), suggesting that higher cognitive 
ability is associated with conservative views on economic issues, but effect sizes were extremely heterogeneous. Tests using 
representative survey data provided support for both a positive association of cognitive ability with economic conservatism 
that is mediated through income as well as for a negative association that is mediated through a higher need for certainty. 
Hence, multiple causal mechanisms with countervailing effects might explain the low overall association of cognitive ability 
with economic political attitudes.
Keywords
cognitive ability, intelligence, economic attitudes, economic ideology, meta-analysis
Received January 11, 2021; revision accepted August 27, 2021
2 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
parsimoniously characterized as reflections of a single under-
lying left-right or liberalism-conservatism ideology dimen-
sion. In contrast to this view, multi-dimensional accounts of 
the structure of political attitudes usually argue in favor of 
distinguishing between at least two key dimensions of politi-
cal ideology (Carmines & D’Amico, 2015; Duckitt, 2001; 
Eysenck, 1954; Jost et al., 2003; Lipset, 1960): The sociocul-
tural dimension refers to the tension between personal free-
dom, autonomy, and diversity on the left and the maintenance 
of common identity and traditional social norms and values 
on the right. The left pole is also referred to as social liberal-
ism and the right pole as social conservatism. In contrast, the 
economic dimension is characterized by a conflict between a 
preference for equality and the acceptance of regulatory 
interventions into the market on the left and a preference for 
self-responsibility and competition as well as acceptance of 
social inequality on the right. The two end poles have also 
been denoted as economic liberalism versus economic 
conservatism.1
The distinction between the sociocultural and the eco-
nomic dimension of ideology refers to fundamental lines of 
tension concerning the proper way of organizing society. 
Specific political attitudes can be associated with both ideol-
ogy dimensions (e.g., Jedinger & Burger, 2019, 2020). 
However, specific attitudes that are typically considered 
sociocultural (e.g., on immigration, women’s rights, or 
acceptance of homosexuality) are usually more strongly 
associated with the sociocultural ideology dimension while 
specific economic attitudes (e.g., on minimum wages, social 
welfare, or market optimism) are usually more strongly asso-
ciated with the economic ideology dimension. Hence, spe-
cific political attitudes can be used as proxies for estimating 
a person’s ideological orientation (e.g., Everett, 2013).
The distinction between the ideology dimensions is rele-
vant because empirical evidence shows that sociocultural 
ideology and economic ideology represent empirically dis-
tinct dimensions of ideological thinking that are rooted in 
different psychological dispositions (e.g., Duckitt & Sibley, 
2010; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Johnston & Ollerenshaw, 
2020; Middendorp, 1978; Treier & Hillygus, 2009; 
Zumbrunnen & Gangl, 2008). Hence, the ideological dimen-
sions do not necessarily have to be congruent in the sense of 
a classical left-right schema with culturally and economi-
cally conservative attitudes on the right and culturally and 
economically liberal positions on the left. For example, 
recent research demonstrates that a left-authoritarian attitude 
structure where cultural conservative views are combined 
with left-wing economic positions is not uncommon in mass 
publics (Lefkofridi et al., 2014; Malka et al., 2019).
When it comes to the association of ideological orienta-
tions with psychological dispositions and—more specifi-
cally—with cognitive abilities, Adorno and his colleagues 
(1950) were among the first to propose that lower intelli-
gence and rigid styles of information processing are related 
to conservative social and economic attitudes. The terms 
cognitive ability and intelligence refer to “a highly general 
information-processing capacity that facilitates reasoning, 
problem solving, decision making, and other higher order 
thinking skills” (Gottfredson, 1997, p. 81). Scores on mea-
sures of specific cognitive abilities such as verbal ability, 
quantitative ability, spatial ability, or abstract reasoning are 
positively correlated, which has been explained by the prop-
osition of an underlying general intelligence factor, com-
monly known as Spearman’s g (Gottfredson, 1997; Johnson 
et al., 2004; Spearman, 1904 but see Van Der Maas et al., 
2006). Other researchers (e.g., Thurstone, 1938) have argued 
in favor of distinct factors of intelligence instead of a single 
general factor. Hierarchical models of intelligence reconcile 
both views by postulating a general intelligence factor on the 
most abstract level of a hierarchy as well as subfactors on 
different lower levels of abstraction (Carroll, 1993; Cattell, 
1971; Horn & Noll, 1997).
Cognitive ability and intelligence are conceptually and 
empirically distinct from cognitive style (Stanovich, 2012), 
which refers to individual differences in preferred and habit-
ual modes of information search and information processing, 
such as holistic versus analytic thinking (e.g., Talhelm et al., 
2014) or intuitive versus reflective judgment and decision 
making (e.g., Epstein et al., 1996). As pointed out by Onraet 
et al. (2015), individual differences in cognitive style have 
received more attention in research on the psychological 
bases of political attitudes than individual differences in cog-
nitive abilities. Despite the stronger focus of research on 
cognitive style, the investigation of the role of cognitive 
abilities in social and political attitudes has flourished in 
recent years.
Cognitive Abilities and Sociocultural 
Attitudes
Currently, a large body of work indicates a negative associa-
tion between measures of cognitive ability and the endorse-
ment of conservative sociocultural attitudes (Onraet et al., 
2015; Schoon et al., 2010; Van Hiel et al., 2010). For exam-
ple, higher scores in right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) have 
been shown to be associated with lower scores in cognitive 
tasks (Burger et al., 2020; Choma et al., 2019; De keers-
maecker et al., 2018; Heaven et al., 2011). In a large-scale, 
nationally representative UK sample, lower general intelli-
gence in childhood has been found to predict the endorsement 
of conservative ideology at an adult age when controlling for 
education and socioeconomic status (Hodson & Busseri, 
2012). With respect to voting behavior, lower cognitive abili-
ties were associated with more intentions to vote for Donald 
Trump and less intentions to vote for Hillary Clinton in the 
2016 US presidential elections through effects on right-wing 
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (Choma & 
Hanoch, 2017; Ganzach et al., 2019). Even temporary reduc-
tions in cognitive resources through alcohol intoxication, 
cognitive load, or time pressure have been argued to facilitate 
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the endorsement of conservative views (Eidelman et al., 
2012). In a meta-analysis by Onraet and colleagues (2015) 
that included 67 studies, 57 studies showed negative rela-
tions, nine studies showed positive relations, and one study 
showed no relation between cognitive abilities and conserva-
tive attitudes. The average effect size was r = −.20, which 
supports the view that a link between cognitive abilities and 
political views exists but shows also that individual differ-
ences in cognitive ability are only moderately related to polit-
ical views.
Cognitive Abilities and Economic 
Attitudes
In research on the association of cognitive abilities with 
political attitudes, economic attitudes have received less 
attention than sociocultural attitudes, so far. Although the 
role of cognitive abilities in the formation of economic atti-
tudes has become more prominent in recent years, empirical 
results are inconsistent. Several studies provide evidence for 
a positive association of cognitive abilities with economic 
conservatism: Using data from the General Social Survey 
(GSS), some studies have shown that verbal intelligence is 
associated with opposition to governmental regulation of 
markets and the redistribution of income (Caplan & Miller, 
2010; Carl, 2014; Ganzach, 2018, Study 1; Kanazawa, 2010, 
Study 2). Similarly, in an analysis of data from the 2012 
American National Election Study (ANES), Carl (2015) 
demonstrated that individuals with higher verbal intelligence 
are more likely to embrace fiscally conservative beliefs. 
Outside the United States, Oskarsson et al. (2015) observed 
that higher levels of intelligence were related to preferences 
for privatization, lower taxes, and less redistribution of 
wealth among Swedish male twin pairs. Ludeke and 
Rasmussen (2018, Study 2) matched ability test scores from 
Danish draftees with survey data on economic attitudes and 
found a positive relationship between intelligence and eco-
nomic laissez-faire orientations (see also Rasmussen, 2016).
While most of these results are robust to using demo-
graphic controls such as educational attainment, Johnston 
(2018) found no relationship between verbal intelligence and 
economic policy opinions in US data once the level of educa-
tion was controlled for. Other researchers specifically 
explored the role of education and social status as possible 
mechanisms underlying the link between intelligence and 
economic conservatism: In Sweden, Mollerstrom and Seim 
(2014) combined survey responses with intelligence test 
scores from military enlistment records. Their results indi-
cate that higher cognitive abilities were associated with 
demanding less income redistribution among Swedish males 
and that this association was partially accounted for by a 
higher annual income and the belief that economic success is 
based on individual effort rather than luck (see also Karadja 
et al., 2017). Using data from two longitudinal cohort studies 
in the United Kingdom, Lewis and Bates (2018) reported 
that higher levels of intelligence in childhood were associ-
ated with more economically conservative attitudes in adult-
hood. Interestingly, they found support for the hypothesis 
that higher socioeconomic status (educational attainment and 
social class) in adulthood mediates part of the effect of child-
hood intelligence on adult economic attitudes.
Other studies failed to find evidence for a relationship 
between cognitive abilities and economic attitudes at all, 
both using single-item economic orientation questions 
(Choma et al., 2019; Pennycook et al., 2014) as well as lon-
ger batteries of economic issue opinions (Kirkegaard et al., 
2017; Saribay & Yilmaz, 2017; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2016, 
Study 2). Finally, Sterling et al. (2016) found that higher per-
formance on several cognitive ability measures was associ-
ated with less endorsement of free-market positions and 
self-identified economic liberalism in the US-American 
sense. Taken together, the empirical findings presented so far 
provide mixed evidence about the association of cognitive 
abilities with economic attitudes.
Explaining the Link Between Cognitive 
Ability and Economic Ideology
As a step toward understanding the inconsistency of findings 
on the association of cognitive abilities with economic atti-
tudes, it is worthwhile to consider the theoretical explana-
tions for such a link that have been put forward in the 
literature. In the following, we distinguish between three 
theoretical accounts.
The Self-Interest Hypothesis
A straightforward explanation for a positive association of 
cognitive ability scores with economic conservatism parts 
from the idea that higher cognitive abilities are associated 
with higher levels of formal education (possibly, with causal 
links in both directions). Higher formal education, in turn, 
constitutes and facilitates higher social and economic status. 
As a consequence, according to this view, high-status indi-
viduals have more to lose from governmental redistribution 
of their (anticipated) wealth than low-status individuals 
(Johnston, 2018). Hence, they are less supportive of govern-
mental regulations of markets, progressive taxation, and 
social welfare policies due to self-interest.
As discussed above, a range of empirical findings are con-
sistent with the self-interest hypothesis by showing that indi-
cators of socioeconomic status account for the association of 
cognitive abilities with ideological orientations fully (Lewis & 
Bates, 2018; Mollerstrom & Seim, 2014) or at least partially 
(Caplan & Miller, 2010; Carl, 2014; Ganzach, 2018, Study 1; 
Kanazawa, 2010, Study 2). In a recent study, Ganzach (2020) 
demonstrated that education and income—two components 
that are typically treated as indicators of socioeconomic sta-
tus—differentially mediated the effect of intelligence on polit-
ical ideology: Cognitive ability fostered liberal views via its 
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positive effect on education, whereas higher levels of cogni-
tive ability were positively related to income which in turn 
fueled conservative political orientations.
The Economic Sophistication Hypothesis
According to this view, understanding the rationale and ben-
efits of typically conservative economic policy principles 
such as free markets, comparative advantages, economic 
competition, privatization, and restrictive welfare programs 
requires more background knowledge than understanding 
the rationale of left-wing economic policy principles such as 
the redistribution of wealth and strong social support sys-
tems. In other words, more intelligent people “think more 
like economists” (Caplan & Miller, 2010, p. 636). Lay eco-
nomic thinking is associated with a number of cognitive 
biases, such as the assumption of a fixed pie of societal 
resources that can be redistributed or the do-no-harm heuris-
tic that leads to the rejection of economic measures that harm 
a small group of people but make society as a whole better 
off (Baron et al., 2006; Caplan, 2007). According to this 
view, people of lower intelligence are more prone to lay eco-
nomic thinking and therefore develop a desire for more gov-
ernment intervention and tend to be more skeptical about 
pro-market policies than individuals with higher cognitive 
abilities (Caplan & Miller, 2010).
The Epistemic Needs Hypothesis
In contrast to the previous accounts, the ideology-as-moti-
vated-cognition perspective (Jost et al., 2003) entails the pre-
diction of a negative association between cognitive abilities 
and economic conservatism. At the core of this approach lies 
the assumption that chronically or temporarily increased 
existential and epistemic needs facilitate the endorsement of 
conservative positions on the sociocultural as well as the 
economic dimension. More specifically, two core elements 
of conservatism within many Western societies—resistance 
to change and acceptance of inequality—are seen as instru-
mental for satisfying existential and epistemic needs by pro-
viding protection from potentially destabilizing reforms 
toward more sociocultural pluralism and more economic 
and social equality.2 We refer to this view—also termed the 
rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis (e.g., Malka & Soto, 2015; 
Tetlock, 1984)—as the epistemic needs hypothesis because 
we consider epistemic needs at the core of the mechanism 
that links cognitive abilities to economic political attitudes. 
Even though the ideology-as-motivated-cognition perspec-
tive usually refers to measures of epistemic needs and cogni-
tive style, it might also explain the link between cognitive 
abilities and political attitudes given that lower cognitive 
abilities have been shown to be linked to stronger epistemic 
needs such as the need for cognitive closure (De keers-
maecker et al., 2018). In fact, some explanations offered for 
the link between cognitive abilities and political attitudes fit 
the ideology-as-motivated-cognition perspective and its 
epistemic needs hypothesis very well. For example, Onraet 
et al. (2015) hypothesize that “those with fewer cognitive 
resources drift towards right-wing conservative ideologies 
in an attempt to increase psychological control over their 
context” (p. 601).
The Present Research
In the present research, we first integrated the extant empiri-
cal evidence on the association of cognitive ability with eco-
nomic attitudes in a meta-analysis (Study 1) and then tested 
hypotheses derived from different theoretical explanations 
for this association in an analysis of U.S. survey data (Study 
2). We extended previous research on the link between cog-
nitive ability and political attitudes (e.g., Onraet et al., 2015) 
by focusing on economic attitudes and by putting some of 
the most important explanations for this link to an empirical 
test. In both studies, we focused specifically on economic 
ideologies and attitudes rather than superordinate general-
ized attitudes such as right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 
1981) or social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994). 
In addition, our analyses are restricted to objective measures 




Selection of studies. To identify relevant empirical studies 
for our meta-analysis, we searched various online databases 
(e.g., ISI Web of Knowledge, PsycINFO)3 using a combina-
tion of the following keywords: economic attitudes, eco-
nomic beliefs, economic ideology, economic conservatism, 
economic liberalism, cognitive ability, mental ability, intel-
ligence, IQ, and wordsum.4 In addition, we employed a 
backward and forward citation search to locate additional 
studies that were not indexed by the aforementioned litera-
ture databases.
To be included in our meta-analysis, studies had to meet 
the following criteria. First, the study had to include at least 
one behavioral measure of cognitive ability. That is, studies 
that used self-report measures of cognitive ability or intelli-
gence were not taken into account, as well as studies that 
employed measures of cognitive style such as variants of 
the cognitive reflection test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) and 
measures of cognitive rigidity (e.g., Zmigrod et al., 2019). 
Second, the study examines at least one aspect of economic 
ideology. Economic ideology is defined as beliefs about how 
the economy does or should work. This encompasses views 
on how the production, exchange, distribution and consump-
tion of goods and services are organized and the role of gov-
ernment in these processes, as well as attitudes toward the 
redistribution of economic resources. Thus, we excluded 
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studies that employed generalized ideological attitudes such 
as social dominance orientation, justice ideologies or (anti-)
egalitarianism. Third, we focused on quantitative studies that 
contain sufficient statistical information to calculate zero-
order correlations as measures of effect size. If this informa-
tion was not available, the authors were contacted to provide 
the necessary statistics or the corresponding raw data with up 
to three contact attempts over a 3-week period.
Figure 1 shows a flowchart for the selection of studies. 
After duplicates were removed, our search resulted in 168 
records whose abstracts were screened. We excluded 97 arti-
cles that did not actually investigate the association of cogni-
tive abilities with economic attitudes. Out of the remaining 
71 articles, 52 were not suitable for the present meta-analysis 
because they were theoretical or review articles, did not con-
tain any measures of economic ideology, or no effect sizes 
Figure 1. PRISMA flowchart of study selection.
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were reported, and authors did not respond to queries. 
Furthermore, four studies were excluded because they relied 
on exactly the same data as earlier studies from the same 
authors (Carl, 2015; Karadja et al., 2017; Lewis, 2018; 
Ludeke & Rasmussen, 2018).
Finally, we identified 19 records that were, in principle, 
eligible for inclusion in the present meta-analyses. However, 
during the coding of the studies, we found that four studies 
used data from different but overlapping waves of the GSS 
(Caplan & Miller, 2010; Carl, 2014; Ganzach, 2018 Study 1; 
Kanazawa, 2010, Study 2). The GSS is a nationally represen-
tative multitopic survey that has been measuring the verbal 
intelligence of respondents with the so-called Wordsum test 
since 1974 (Cor et al., 2012). To maintain the statistical inde-
pendence of the effect sizes from these four studies, we 
accessed the original data and reanalyzed the reported cor-
relations following the original study protocols as closely as 
possible. This enabled us to exclude redundant associations 
and to include the four studies as a joint study in our analysis. 
As seen in Table 1, the final sample included 19 articles with 
23 studies and k = 20 independent effect sizes (N = 46,426).
Coding of study characteristics. Various study characteristics 
were coded to examine possible moderator variables. For 
each study, we coded which measures of cognitive ability 
were administered. The majority of studies relied on the 
Wordsum test (n = 7), an objective numeracy test (n = 3) or 
a mix of both instruments (n = 3). As described above, 
Wordsum is a short vocabulary test that asks respondents to 
identify one word in a set of five whose meaning is closest to 
a target word (Cor et al., 2012). Numeracy tests measure the 
ability to understand statistical information by performing 
mathematical operations involving proportions, percentages, 
and probabilities, and they are available in different formats 
(e.g., Lipkus et al., 2001; Schwartz et al., 1997).
The studies under investigation used a variety of instru-
ments to measure economic ideologies. These included self-
placement on an economic liberal-conservative or left-right 
continuum (n = 4) as well as scales that assessed specific 
positions related to economic policies (n = 17). Other studies 
combined ideological self-placement with policy attitudes (n 
= 2). Accordingly, we classified measures of economic ideol-
ogy as symbolic, operational or mixed. This categorization is 
important because there is evidence that both symbolic and 
operational measures represent different aspects of ideologi-
cal thinking (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Ellis & Stimson, 
2012). Ideological self-identification reflects the affective 
attachment to political in-groups and their symbols and not 
necessarily a person’s attitudes toward specific political 
issues. Symbolic ideology is typically assessed by a single 
self-placement item (e.g., “How liberal or conservative do 
you tend to be when it comes to economic policy?”; Choma 
et al., 2019). However, terms like “economically conserva-
tive” or “economically liberal” are inherently vague and may 
be interpreted in very different ways by different respondents, 
especially when people have a poor understanding of eco-
nomic concepts (see Bauer et al., 2017). In contrast, opera-
tional ideology focuses on preferences for concrete policy 
proposals (e.g., whether an individual should be more respon-
sible for himself or the public sector should be responsible for 
taking care of all; Rasmussen, 2016). The two dimensions of 
ideological thinking do not necessarily have to be congruent. 
Research has shown, for example, that people who identify 
themselves as conservatives may support liberal policies such 
as social redistribution programs at the operational level and 
vice versa (e.g., Ellis & Stimson, 2012).
Unfortunately, no standard for the operational measure-
ment of economic beliefs has yet been established. Although 
there are some psychometrically tested scales (e.g., Everett, 
2013; Henningham, 1997), instruments to measure economic 
policy attitudes are usually formed ad hoc, which makes it 
difficult to compare the correlations obtained with cognitive 
abilities. While the internal reliability of these ad hoc scales 
is often quite high (e.g., Kirkegaard et al., 2017; Lewis & 
Bates, 2018; Rasmussen, 2016), their construct validity is 
rarely tested. Thus, the inconclusiveness of the results 
described in the literature review may also be due to the het-
erogeneity of the measurement of economic ideologies.
Although, we had no leverage to control for the validity of 
ideological measures, we coded the number of items of the 
scales assuming that more comprehensive scales produced 
more reliable estimates of effect size. Most studies employed 
between 2 and 10 items (n = 11), eight studies used a single 
item, and four studies employed more than ten items to mea-
sure economic ideology. Another factor that could influence 
the relationship between cognitive skills and economic ori-
entations is the sampling methodology. Interestingly, most 
studies were based on representative population samples 
(n = 13), while a smaller number used self-selected (non-
probability) samples to recruit subjects (n = 10), for exam-
ple, from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Finally, we 
extracted basic study characteristics relating to the time 
period and location of data collection (USA, n = 15; 
Scandinavia, n = 5; UK, n = 2; Turkey, n = 1).
Meta-analytic procedures and estimations of effect sizes. In the 
present meta-analysis, we used a random-effects (RE) model 
with a restricted maximum likelihood (REML) approach to 
estimate effect sizes. In contrast to fixed-effects models, RE 
models assume that the true effect sizes over studies follow a 
distribution whose mean value represents the average effect 
(Borenstein et al., 2010; Card, 2016). Thus, the models take 
into account that the observed heterogeneity of the estimated 
effects is due to not only natural fluctuations of the samples 
(sampling error) but also, possibly, other sources because the 
effect size estimates are not drawn from a single population. 
This allows us to generalize the results beyond the studies 
that we have included in our meta-analysis.
Pearson’s r was used to calculate the effect sizes. All mea-
sures of economic ideology were coded so that higher values 
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Table 1. Summary of Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis.
Study ID Author(s)
Effect 







No. of items in 
ideology measure(s)
1 Caplan & Miller 
(2010)
.06 2,373 American 
adults
GSS Wordsum Operational 17
2 Carl (2014) .21 1,247 American 
adults
GSS Wordsum Operational 6





4 Choma et al. 
(2019)—Study 1





5 Choma et al. 
(2019)—Study 2





6 Cor et al. (2012)  .21 3,519 American 
adults
Mixed Wordsum Operational 1
7 Ganzach (2018)—
Study 1
.16 4,515 American 
adults
GSS Wordsum Operational 3
8 Ganzach (2018)—
Study 2
−.03 3,841 American 
adults
NLSYC PPVT Operational 1
 GSSa  .10 2,373 American 
adults
GSS Wordsum Operational 30







.20 5,827 American 
adults
GSS Wordsum Operational 2
11 Kemmelmeier 
(2008)—Study 1
−.02 4,901 American 
students
CIRP SAT, ACT Operational 1
12 Kirkegaard et al. 
(2017)
 .07 259 Danish adults Online 
Panel
ICAR-5 Operational 10
13 Lewis & Bates 
(2018)—BCS 
1970
 .19 6,736 British children/
adults
BCS70 British ability scales Operational 6
14 Lewis & Bates 
(2018)—NCDS 
1958
.25 8,961 British children/
adults
NCDS58 General ability test Operational 6
15 Mollerstrom & 
Seim (2014)







16 Nilsson et al. 
(2019)
 .10 985 Swedish adults Online 
Panel
Numeracy Symbolic 1
17 Oskarsson et al. 
(2015)
 .21 1,946 Swedish adult 
men
SALTY SALTY, Swedish 
military test
Operational 8
18 Pennycook et al. 
(2014)













 .06 1,408 American 
adults
MTurk ICAR Operational 3
21 Saribay & Yilmaz 
(2017)






22 Sterling et al. 
(2016)





23 Yilmaz & Saribay 
(2016)—Study 2







Note. GSS = General Social Survey; ANES = American National Election Study; MTurk = Amazon Mechanical Turk; NLSYC = National Longitudinal 
Study–Children; CIRP = Cooperative Institutional Research Program; BCS70 = British Cohort Study 1979; NCDS58 = National Child Development 
Study 1958; SALTY = Screening across the Life-span Twin [Younger] cohort study.
aTo maintain the statistical independence of the studies that relied on data from the GSS (Caplan & Miller, 2010; Carl, 2014; Ganzach, 2018, Study 1; 
Kanazawa, 2010, Study 2), we reanalyzed the original data and included the four studies as a joint study in our meta-analysis.
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indicate a higher degree of economic conservatism. For the 
present purpose, we define economic conservatism in the 
US-American sense as opposition toward governmental 
intervention in markets and the acceptance of economic 
inequality (see also Crowson, 2009; Zumbrunnen & Gangl, 
2008). Thus, positive correlations indicate that higher levels 
of cognitive ability are associated with a more conservative 
economic ideology. If a study reports separate correlations 
for different measures of cognitive abilities and/or a set of 
economic issue positions, these effect sizes were transformed 
into Fisher-z values, averaged, and then transformed back 
into a correlation coefficient, which was then coded as the 
total effect size for the study. The data and code are openly 
available on the Open Science Framework at https://osf.
io/36brp/.
Results and Discussion
Overall effect of cognitive ability on economic ideology. Overall, 
cognitive ability was positively and significantly associated 
with economic conservatism, r = .07, z = 2.67, p = .008, 
95% CI = [0.02, 0.12] (see Figure 2).5 The magnitude of this 
weighted average correlation corresponds to a relatively 
small effect size (Gignac & Szodorai, 2016). However, the 
Figure 2. Forest plot of the effects of cognitive ability on economic ideology.
Note. Positive effect sizes indicate that higher levels of cognitive ability are associated with a more conservative economic ideology. The diamond 
represents the overall estimated effect size and its 95% confidence interval using a random-effects model. Homogeneity: Q(19) = 551.43, p < .001,  
I2 = 96.2%. NCDS = National Child Development Study; BCS = British Cohort Study.
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extent of heterogeneity among reported effect sizes is strik-
ing, τ2 (effect size variance) = 0.01, τ (effect size standard 
deviation) = 0.11, Q(19) = 551.43, p < .001. As indicated 
by the I2 statistic, 96.2% of the variability among effect sizes 
is caused by systematic factors and cannot be attributed to 
sampling errors alone. As a point of reference, 25%, 50% 
and 75% in terms of the variability of effect sizes correspond 
to low, moderate and substantial heterogeneity in meta-anal-
yses (Higgins & Thompson, 2002). Another way to illustrate 
between-study heterogeneity is to use prediction intervals, 
which indicate the range of predicted effect sizes in a poten-
tial future study (Borenstein et al., 2017; Higgins et al., 
2009).6 In the present case, we would predict that the correla-
tions lie somewhere between −0.16 and 0.29 for 95% of 
similar studies that will be conducted in the future. This 
means that, although cognitive ability is on average posi-
tively associated with a more conservative economic out-
look, the possible range of effect sizes contains negative 
associations. The high degree of heterogeneity among effect 
sizes suggests that the relationship between cognitive ability 
and economic ideology depends strongly on third variables.
Moderator analyses. To examine potential sources of hetero-
geneity among studies, we conducted a series of categorical 
moderator analyses. Following Onraet et al. (2015), we set 
the significance level to p < .01 (.05/5) to adjust for multiple 
comparisons. The results indicated that the type of cognitive 
ability measure (general, verbal, or numerical) did not sig-
nificantly moderate the relationship between cognitive abil-
ity and economic ideology, Q(2) = 1.80, p = .41. We next 
tested whether effect sizes differed among the types of ideol-
ogy measures administered, which yielded a significant dif-
ference, Q(2) = 14.34, p = .001. Cognitive abilities were 
positively associated with operational economic ideology 
(r = .11, z = 3.89, p = .0001, 95% CI = [0.05, 0.16]), while 
studies that assessed economic preferences with symbolic 
(r = −.01, z = −0.28, p = .78, 95% CI = [−0.10, 0.07]) or 
mixed scales (r = −.07, z = −1.70, p = .09, 95% CI = 
[−0.16, 0.01]) showed no significant associations.7
Contrary to our expectations, effect sizes did not signifi-
cantly differ as a function of the number of items employed, 
Q(2) = 0.66, p = .72. However, the type of sampling meth-
odology was a significant moderator of effect sizes, Q(1) = 
11.89, p = .001. Cognitive ability was more strongly related 
to endorsements of free-market positions among probabil-
ity samples of the population (r = .13, z = 4.05, p = .001, 
95% CI = [0.07, 0.20]) than among self-selected samples 
of students or MTurk workers (r = −.002, z = −0.11, p = 
.92, 95% CI = [−0.05, 0.04]), which might be a conse-
quence of higher homogeneity of the latter type of sample 
in terms of cognitive ability and/or political attitudes. 
Finally, the location of the study conditioned the magnitude 
of effect sizes, Q(1) = 7.34, p = .007, with stronger asso-
ciations emerging in Scandinavian, British or Turkish 
Table 2. Moderators of the Effect of Cognitive Ability on Economic Ideology.




Overall effect 20 46,426 .07** [0.02, 0.12] [−0.16, 0.29] 551.43*** 96.2%
Measures of cognitive ability 1.80  
 General 12 26,877 .08* [0.002, 0.15] [−0.21, 0.34] 354.04*** 96.6%
 Verbal 5 17,703 .09* [0.01, 0.17] [−0.23, 0.39] 125.73*** 96.7%
 Numerical 3 1,846 −.001 [−0.11, 0.11] [−0.87, 0.86] 11.76** 80.7%
Measure of economic ideology 14.34**  
 Symbolic 4 2,351 −.01 [−0.10, 0.07] [−0.36, 0.34] 14.02** 74.9%
 Operational 14 43,536 .11*** [0.05, 0.16] [−0.12, 0.32] 484.39*** 96.6%
 Mixed 2 539 −.07 [−0.16, 0.01] — 0.82 0.00%
Number of items 0.66  
 1 8 14,883 .04 [−0.04, 0.13] [−0.26, 0.34] 165.46*** 95.8%
 2–10 8 20,797 .09 [−0.003, 0.18] [−0.24, 0.39] 136.05*** 97.0%
 >10 4 10,746 .08** [0.02, 0.13] [−0.17, 0.32] 23.12*** 85.1%
Sampling methodology 11.89**  
 Non-probability 10 9,861 −.002 [−0.05, 0.04] [−0.13, 0.13] 27.28** 68.6%
 Probability 10 36,565 .13*** [0.07,0.20] [−0.11, 0.37] 339.56*** 97.3%
Location 7.34**  
 USA 12 25,917 .02 [−0.04, 0.08] [−0.19, 0.23] 198.95*** 94.3%
Scandinavia/UK/Turkey 7 20,509 .14*** [0.07, 0.21] [−0.10, 0.37] 90.48*** 94.6%
Note. Positive effect sizes indicate that higher levels of cognitive ability are associated with a more conservative economic ideology. k = number of 
independent samples, CI = confidence interval, PI = prediction interval.
*p ≤ .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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samples (r = .14, z = 4.03, p = .0001, 95% CI = [0.07, 
0.21]), while North American samples showed no signifi-
cant associations (r = .02, z = 0.74, p = .46, 95% CI 
[−0.04, 0.08]) (Table 2).
Publication bias and sensitivity analyses. A potential threat to 
the conclusions of meta-analyses is publication bias, some-
times also called small-study bias (Card, 2016). This means 
that studies with statistically nonsignificant results have less 
chance of being published, which distorts the estimated aver-
age effect size. This mostly concerns studies with smaller 
sample sizes and lower power to detect statistically signifi-
cant results. Figure 3 shows a contour-enhanced funnel plot in 
which the observed effect sizes (r) are plotted against their 
precision (standard errors) accompanied by common regions 
of statistical significance (Peters et al., 2008). If there is no 
bias present, studies should be symmetrically distributed 
around the average effect size, with studies with larger effect 
sizes (more precise studies) at the top and studies with smaller 
effect sizes (less precise) at the bottom, which creates the 
appearance of an inverted funnel. A small-study bias is typi-
cally shown by the fact that studies are distributed asymmetri-
cally around the average effect size and smaller (less precise) 
studies seem to be missing in the region of insignificance.
As seen in Figure 3, the distribution in our case is asym-
metrical, but this mainly concerns large studies that concen-
trate on the right-hand side of the plot and thus suggest a 
positive association between intelligence and economic con-
servatism. The visual impression was confirmed by Egger’s 
test for asymmetry (Egger et al., 1997), which regressed the 
effect size on its standard error, b = −2.65, SE = 1.26, z = 
−2.10, p = .04. As we have seen, however, our sample of 
studies is characterized by extreme heterogeneity, which can 
also cause an asymmetric distribution of effect sizes (Sterne 
et al., 2011). In other words, the asymmetry is mainly due to 
factors like the type of ideological measure or sampling 
methodology and cannot be attributed to a publication bias 
based on statistical significance. This is because the area 
where studies seem to be “missing” (on the left-hand side of 
the plot) covers significant negative associations between 
cognitive ability and economic ideology, which are unlikely 
to disappear in file-drawers (Peters et al., 2008). To account 
for the between-study heterogeneity, we repeated Egger’s 
test with the significant moderators as covariates. The results 
yielded no significant evidence for funnel plot asymmetry, b 
= −1.11, SE = 1.49, z = −0.75, p = .46, which lends further 
support to the heterogeneity interpretation of the funnel plot 
asymmetry.
Study 2
The meta-analytic results of Study 1 indicate a weak average 
association between cognitive ability and economic ideology 
as well as strong heterogeneity of the size and sign of the 
Figure 3. Contour-enhanced funnel plot of the effects of cognitive ability on economic ideology.
Note. Dashed lines indicate the 5% and 1% significance contours, respectively.
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observed associations. At the same time, the theoretical 
explanations for the link between mental abilities and eco-
nomic attitudes are also heterogeneous with respect to the 
sign of the association and the mediating mechanism they 
propose. While Study 1 focused on synthesizing the empiri-
cal evidence on the association of cognitive ability with eco-
nomic attitudes as such, Study 2 sought to investigate the 
mechanisms underlying this association by systematically 
testing hypotheses derived from different theoretical per-
spectives: First, the self-interest hypothesis posits that the 
link between cognitive ability and economic ideology is 
accounted for by socioeconomic status. Individuals with 
higher cognitive skills are more likely to attain a higher 
socioeconomic status which compels them to adopt more 
conservative views on economic issues. Second, the eco-
nomic sophistication hypothesis posits that cognitive ability 
is positively associated with economic knowledge, which in 
turn predicts a more conservative economic outlook. Third, 
the epistemic needs hypothesis suggests that epistemic needs 
mediate between cognitive ability and economic ideology. 
Specifically, cognitive ability is negatively associated with 
needs for security and certainty, which in turn are positively 
associated with economic conservatism. This mechanism 
should facilitate a negative overall relationship between cog-
nitive ability and economic conservatism. Importantly, the 
different explanations are not mutually exclusive and coun-
tervailing effects of the different mechanisms could explain 
the low overall correlation observed in Study 1.
An a priori Monte Carlo power analysis (Schoemann 
et al., 2017) indicated that we need a simple size of at least N 
= 1,300 to detect a small indirect effect (.01) with adequate 
power (90%). Therefore, we relied on the 2016 ANES, which 
is a continuing program of high-quality surveys of sufficient 
sample size and contains several questions regarding atti-
tudes toward economic issues. Moreover, the 2016 ANES 
included the established Wordsum test as a proxy for cogni-
tive ability. The data and materials are openly available on 
the ANES website at https://electionstudies.org.
Method
Participants. The 2016 ANES was a two-wave panel survey, 
administered face-to-face and online on a probability sample 
of U.S. citizens aged 18 or older (for methodological details, 
see DeBell et al., 2018). The sample included N = 4,271 pre-
election interviews and N = 3,649 post-election re-inter-
views. The following analyses are limited to participants 
who took part in the pre- and post-election waves and pro-
vided complete answers to all variables under study, leaving 
a final sample size of N = 3,375. Of these, 46.8% were male, 
with a mean age of 49 years (SD = 17.6). Most participants 
identified as non-Hispanic white (72.7%). In terms of educa-
tion, 6.1% reported less than a high-school degree, 54.2% 
reported a high-school degree or some college and 39.6% 
reported an undergraduate degree or higher. The median 
annual household income was 45,000–74,999 U.S. dollars. 
We employed sample weights provided by the survey team 
to account for the complex sample design of the ANES and 
to adjust for demographic discrepancies from U.S. popula-
tion estimates due to nonresponse.
Measures
Cognitive ability. To obtain a proxy for cognitive ability, 
we used the 10-item Wordsum test which is a subset of items 
from the Thorndike-Gallup (Thorndike, 1942; Thorndike 
& Gallup, 1944) test of verbal intelligence. Previous work 
demonstrated that verbal ability scores are closely related to 
more comprehensives tests of general intelligence (Miner, 
1957; Wolfle, 1980; Zhu & Weiss, 2005). The Wordsum test 
consists of 10 multiple-choice items, each of which presents 
participants with one target word and five response options 
(one correct and four distractors). Participants are asked to 
identify the word whose meaning is closest to the target word 
(e.g., “Tell me the number of the word that comes closest to 
the meaning of the word BEAST”: 1 = afraid; 2 = words; 
3 = large; 4 = animal; 5 = separate). A total test score 
was generated by averaging the number of correct answers, 
with higher scores indicating a higher proportion of correct 
answers (M = .68, SD = .24; KR-20 = .75; McDonald’s 
ω = .75).
Economic attitudes. To measure economic ideology, we 
selected those questions in the 2016 ANES that (a) covered 
participants attitudes toward economic policy issues and (b) 
were measured on a continuous scale. We identified eight 
questions that met these criteria. An exploratory factor anal-
ysis of these items revealed a single factor (eigenvalue = 
3.57) explaining 45% of the total variance. All items loaded 
highly on this factor (≥ .57), except for one question regard-
ing attitudes toward free trade agreements (−0.17). The item 
was removed from the final scale and is examined separately 
in the Online Supplementary Materials. The questions were 
recoded to range from 0 to 1 and averaged to form an eco-
nomic attitudes composite (M = .46, SD = .20; Cronbach’s 
α = .81; McDonald’s ω = .85). Higher scores on this scale 
reflect more conservative views on economic issues.
Socioeconomic status. Socioeconomic status was assessed 
by educational attainment (0 = less than high school; 0.25 = 
high school degree; 0.50 = some college/associate degree; 
0.75 = undergraduate degree; and 1 = graduate degree; 
M = .49, SD = .29) and self-reported annual household 
income, recoded to quantiles (0 = less than $22,500; 0.25 
= $22,500–$44,999; 0.50 = $45,000–$74,999; 0.75 = 
$75,000–$109,999; and 1 = $110,000 or more; M = .50, 
SD = .36).
Politico-economic knowledge. Unfortunately, the 2016 ANES 
questionnaire contains only two genuinely economic knowl-
edge questions: about the current national unemployment rate 
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and the minimum wage in participant’s state. Since economic 
and political knowledge are highly correlated (Delli Carpini 
& Keeter, 1996), we decided to build an index from both 
knowledge domains to increase the reliability of the measure. 
The index consists of 11 factual knowledge questions across 
a wide range of American politics. All answers were coded as 
either correct or incorrect and averaged to construct an index 
of politico-economic knowledge, such that higher scores indi-
cate a higher proportion of correct answers (M = .53, SD = 
.23; KR-20 = 0.72; McDonald’s ω = .73).
Epistemic needs. Following Johnston et al. (2017), we 
assessed epistemic needs using the Authoritarian Child-
Rearing Values (ACRV) scale. Even though the ACRV is 
considered a measure of authoritarianism rather than a direct 
measure of epistemic needs, past research argued that author-
itarian individuals are more sensitive to threat and intolerant 
of uncertainty (e.g., Feldman, 2003; Jost et al., 2003). Conse-
quently, authoritarian child-rearing values haven been used 
as a reasonable proxy for heightened needs for security and 
certainty (Johnston et al., 2017). In the ACRV scale, artici-
pants are asked to choose among four pairs of qualities that 
children should learn (“independence or respect for elders,” 
“curiosity or good manners,” “obedience or self-reliance,” 
and “being considerate or well behaved”). Authoritarian 
answers are coded 1, neutral answers (don’t know, neither) 
are coded 0.50, and non-authoritarian answers are coded 0. 
An overall score was computed by taking the sum divided by 
the total number of items (M = .56, SD = .32; Cronbach’s α 
= .64; McDonald’s ω = .65) with higher scores indicating a 
heightened need for certainty.
Controls. The demographic controls were age, sex (1 = 
male and 0 = female), and self-identified race (1 = non-
Hispanic white and 0 = other).
Results and Discussion
At the bivariate level, cognitive ability was weakly posi-
tively associated with economic conservatism, r = .05, t = 
2.65, p = .008, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.08]. The magnitude of the 
correlation was fairly similar to the overall effect size 
reported in Study 1 and fell within the 95% confidence inter-
val of the meta-analytic effect size estimate. The full set of 
bivariate correlations among all study variables are available 
in the Supplementary Materials.
To test the hypothesized multiple mediator model, we 
estimated a fully saturated path model with observed vari-
ables using the maximum likelihood method.8 As shown in 
Figure 4, cognitive ability was significantly positively related 
to educational attainment (β = .39, SE = .02, t = 19.10, p < 
.001, 95% CI = [0.35, 0.43]), income (β = .31, SE = .02, 
t = 15.81, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.27, 0.35]), and politico-
economic knowledge (β = .46, SE = .02, t = 23.25, p < 
.001, 95% CI = [0.42, 0.49]). In turn, only income was sig-
nificantly linked to economic conservatism (β = .15, SE = 
Figure 4. Path model showing the relationships between cognitive ability and economic conservatism as mediated by socioeconomic 
status, politico-economic knowledge, and epistemic needs.
Note. Entries are standardized path coefficients for the full model. The full model includes the direct effects of demographic covariates on all endogenous 
variables, which for the sake of brevity are not shown. The dashed lines indicate nonsignificant paths (p > .05), N = 3,375. Weighted data.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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.02, t = 6.79, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.11, 0.20]). As expected, 
cognitive ability was significantly negatively related to 
higher need for certainty (β = −.33, SE = .02, t = −15.85, p 
< .001, 95% CI = [−0.38, −0.29]), which in turn was posi-
tively linked to more conservative views on economic issues 
(β = .23, SE = .02, t = 12.15, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.19, 
0.27]). After adjusting for demographic covariates and the 
mediating variables, the direct effect of cognitive ability on 
economic conservatism was non-significant (β = −.01, SE = 
.02, t = −0.29, p = .77, 95% CI = [−0.06, 0.04]). Overall, 
the model explained 12.2% of the variance in economic 
attitudes.
Finally, the indirect effects of cognitive ability were tested 
using the Monte Carlo method to construct 95% confidence 
intervals with 5,000 replications (Preacher & Selig, 2012). 
Since there are no significant paths between educational 
attainment or politico-economic knowledge and economic 
attitudes, we restrict our analysis to the effects of income and 
epistemic needs. The results of the mediation analysis pro-
vided significant empirical evidence for both indirect effects: 
First, for a positive indirect effect of cognitive ability on eco-
nomic conservatism that is mediated through income (β = 
.05, SE = .01, z = 6.20, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.03, 0.06]), 
which is consistent with the self-interest hypothesis. Second, 
for a negative indirect effect of cognitive ability on economic 
conservatism that is mediated through need for certainty (β 
= −.08, SE = .01, z = 12.15, p < .001, 95% CI = [−0.09, 
−0.06]), which is consistent with the epistemic needs 
hypothesis.
General Discussion
In the present research, we investigated the association of 
cognitive abilities with economic attitudes by synthesizing 
the extant empirical evidence in a meta-analysis (Study 1) 
and by testing hypotheses concerning possible mechanisms 
underlying this association that follow from different theo-
retical perspectives (Study 2). Our meta-analysis provided 
evidence for a small positive association (r = .07) of cogni-
tive abilities with economic conservatism, on average. 
However, the effect sizes and directions of the associations 
were very heterogeneous. The strength of the association 
was moderated by several methodological features of the 
extant studies: It tended to be more pronounced in studies 
that used measures of operational rather than symbolic eco-
nomic ideology (or mixed scales), in studies that used prob-
ability samples of the population rather than self-selected 
samples, and in studies that used Turkish, British, or 
Scandinavian rather than North-American samples. However, 
it was not moderated through the type or number of items of 
the cognitive ability measure that was used.
In the light of the heterogeneity of the size and sign of the 
association of mental abilities with economic attitudes 
observed in Study 1, Study 2 aimed at investigating different 
hypotheses that have been proposed to explain the 
association. Here, we found support for a mediation of a 
positive effect of mental abilities on economic conservatism 
through income. This supports the self-interest hypothesis 
according to which higher cognitive abilities facilitate higher 
social status and high-status individuals are less supportive 
of governmental regulations of markets, and redistributive 
social policies because they have more to lose from these 
measures than low-status individuals (Johnston, 2018). We 
found no support for the economic sophistication hypothesis 
according to which a positive association of cognitive abili-
ties with economic conservatism is mediated through eco-
nomic knowledge. However, we found support for a negative 
effect of cognitive abilities on economic conservatism that is 
mediated through need for certainty. Importantly, the fact 
that we found support for two hypotheses proposing counter-
vailing effects of mental abilities on economic political atti-
tudes through different causal mechanism offers an 
explanation for the weak average association and the hetero-
geneity of the empirical evidence we observe in Study 1.
Some points concerning our investigation of causal mech-
anisms in the present research need to be highlighted: First, 
we used correlational data to test hypotheses about causal 
mechanisms. The mediation analyses we conducted allow 
for conclusions about whether the empirical data are compat-
ible with and support specific hypotheses about causal mech-
anisms. However, these analyses cannot provide strong 
evidence for causal effects or detect unique causal mecha-
nisms (see Fiedler et al., 2011). Second, the theoretical per-
spectives and hypotheses we described and tested are far 
from exhaustive. The central conclusion from the pattern of 
results of Study 2 is that there is evidence for multiple mech-
anisms with sometimes countervailing effects. However, 
other theoretical perspectives and mechanisms than the ones 
we focused on might also play a role in explaining the asso-
ciation of mental abilities with economic political attitudes.
Third, we derived very abstract hypotheses from the theo-
retical perspectives we introduced to test them empirically. 
The formulation and empirical test of abstract hypotheses 
served the purpose of the current research well. However, 
each of the theoretical perspectives entails more precise pre-
dictions concerning the causal mechanism that links cogni-
tive abilities to economic political attitudes. For example, the 
epistemic needs hypothesis holds that individuals with high 
epistemic needs feel attracted to economic conservatism 
because core elements of economic conservatism are func-
tional for satisfying these needs. While the fact that we find 
evidence for a negative link between cognitive abilities and 
economic conservatism that is mediated through epistemic 
needs supports this view, it is not clear whether a functional 
fit indeed explains the association of epistemic needs with 
economic conservatism. In this respect, it has been argued 
that a functional link between psychological needs and politi-
cal attitudes exists primarily for sociocultural but not for eco-
nomic attitudes (e.g., Federico & Malka, 2018; Johnston & 
Wronski, 2015; Malka & Soto, 2015). From this perspective, 
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in contexts where social and economic conservatism are com-
municated as a coherent package in the political discourse, 
individuals with high epistemic needs who are familiar with 
the discourse and perceive politics as personally relevant tend 
to endorse economic conservatism to express their identity as 
conservatives rather than because economic conservatism is 
particularly suitable to satisfy their needs (for empirical evi-
dence, see Jedinger & Burger, 2019, 2020; Johnston et al., 
2017; Malka et al., 2014).
There is much room for future research to test different 
theoretical assumption on specific causal links between 
cognitive abilities empirically. A further promising avenue 
for future research on the link between cognitive abilities 
and political attitudes lies in focusing on specific combina-
tions of economic and sociocultural attitudes along with 
corresponding symbolic self-categorizations of individuals. 
For example, findings by Yilmaz et al. (2020) indicate that 
self-identified libertarians, who combine economic conser-
vatism with liberal sociocultural views, play a crucial role 
in driving the association of cognitive style with economic 
conservatism.
Our findings should also be considered in the light of the 
fact that the data of the present investigation mainly encom-
pass samples from Western, industrialized, rich, and demo-
cratic countries while cultural and national differences may 
have implications for the intelligence-ideology nexus. Hence, 
an important avenue for future research is to extend the inves-
tigation of the link of cognitive abilities with economic policy 
preferences to a broader set of cultural contexts.
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Notes
1. Note that we use the terms in the US-American sense. In a 
European context a conservative economic worldview is typi-
cally referred to as economic liberalism, that is, endorsement of 
economic freedom and support for a competitive market econ-
omy. The opposing view is typically referred to as economic 
leftism or state interventionism.
2. Proponents of this view acknowledge that within societies with 
different historical trajectories conservatism can be character-
ized differently: “[I]t is at least conceivable that the two core 
aspects of left-right ideology [. . .] are decoupled or even nega-
tively correlated in socialist or communist regimes and that this 
could be due to the marshaling of system justification tendencies 
in support of egalitarian rather than hierarchical ideals” (Jost 
et al., 2009 p. 329).
3. We also included online databases that cover articles from 
non-WEIRD countries (SciELO, Redalyc, African Journals 
OnLine, CiNii, J-STAGE, China Integrated Knowledge 
Resources Database CNKI). We revisit this issue in the discus-
sion section.
4. The exact search string was ALL = ([ attitudes OR economic 
beliefs OR economic ideology OR economic conservatism OR 
economic liberalism] AND [cognitive ability OR mental ability 
OR intelligence OR IQ OR wordsum])
5. Additional analyses indicate that the overall association persists 
when controlling for educational attainment as a potential con-
founder, r = 0.07, z = 2.86, p = .004, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.11], 
see the Supplemental Material available online.
6. While the confidence interval indicates the degree of uncertainty 
around the average effect size, the prediction interval signals the 
dispersion around the average effect by incorporating informa-
tion about the between-study variance (τ2).
7. One could argue that the effect of ideological measurement is 
confounded by the number of items. Therefore, we performed 
a meta-regression in which the number of items was controlled 
for. The results showed that the positive association between 
cognitive skills and operational economic ideology was still 
substantial and significant, b = 0.224, SE = 0.099, z = 2.27, 
p = .023.
8. The residuals of all mediating variables were allowed to covary. 
The Supplementary Materials present additional results for the 
other covariates in the path model.
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